Aos primeiros sinais de visão embaçada, as hipóteses mais frequentes sempre são miopia, astigmatismo, hipermetropia. Mas esses sintomas podem indicar outra doença ocular chamada ceratocone - uma deformidade progressiva da córnea, que assume o formato...
The post Visão embaçada e distorcida nem sempre é miopia: fique atento aos sinais do ceratocone appeared first on Saúde Próspera.
Unha encravada: quem teve jamais quer repetir a experiência. Os que nunca passaram pela situação, tremem com a ideia de sentir aquela dor de que só ouvem sobre nos relatos.
The post Unha encravada: Como evitar e desencravar appeared first on Saúde Próspera.
Exame poderá detectar a doença na fase inicial. Pesquisadores da Faculdade de Medicina Osteopática da Universidade de Rowan, nos Estados Unidos, afirmam que estão perto de desenvolver um exame de sangue para detectar Alzheimer com precisão, o que dar...
The post Teste de sangue para detectar Alzheimer está próximo da realidade appeared first on Saúde Próspera.
Tratamento genético foi testado em Layla Richards que estava desenganada pelos médicos. Especialistas ressaltam que os resultados são iniciais e podem não ocorrer em outros pacientes.
The post Terapia inédita reverte leucemia incurável em bebê de 1 ano appeared first on Saúde Próspera.
Todo mundo quer ter um sorriso bonito. Justamente por isso, a ideia de perder um ou mais dentes deixa qualquer pessoa desesperada.
The post Saiba como ter um sorriso perfeito appeared first on Saúde Próspera.
Prótese auditiva ancorada em osso não emite um som como o aparelho convencional. Seu diferencial é vibrar o osso da cabeça.
The post SUS vai oferecer aparelho de última geração para tipo de perda auditiva até então sem tratamento appeared first on Saúde Próspera.
Thursday 19 and Friday 20 November 2020, St. Pancras Renaissance Hotel
One hundred years since its founding in 1920, Chatham House continues to foster mutual understanding between nations through rigorous debate, trusted dialogue, independent analysis and influential ideas.
Since its launch in 2014, the London Conference, the institute’s annual flagship event, has established itself as a principal international forum where global connectivity can be explored and better understood drawing an internationally diverse and multigenerational gathering of participants and offering positive solutions to global challenges.
This year, drawing on the theme of Imagining Alternatives: Solutions for the World Beyond 2020, the London Conference 2020 will form the central pillar in the institute’s programme to mark its centenary throughout 2020.
This year’s agenda focuses on the changing nature of geopolitics and the global economy through the lens of our core research themes – sustainable and equitable growth, preventing conflict and improving the rules-based order. Each theme seeks opportunities for positive policy change, with emphasis on the impact of technological change, and a keen focus on empowering the next generation.
7 May 2020
In a world looking for leadership, South Africa’s president Cyril Ramaphosa has been remarkable. One year after he carried the time-worn ANC through a national election, South Africans are crying out for more.In the COVID-19 crisis so far, Cyril Ramaphosa has been widely praised for displaying the decisive leadership so many hoped for when they cast their ballot for him in May 2019. Buttressed by others such as health minister Dr Zweli Mkhize, and on a simple objective to prevent transmission, South Africa has been a lesson to the world. Act fast. Act hard.
Former president Thabo Mbeki’s disastrous response to the HIV crisis cast a long shadow over his legacy, and Ramaphosa has taken note. South Africa has had one of the tightest lockdowns in the world. No exercise. No cigarettes. No alcohol.
The lockdown was imposed when the country had only around 1,000 recorded cases and just two deaths. As a result, transmission from returning travellers has not yet led to an exponential infection rate within the community. The government’s swift reaction has bought much needed time with the peak now seemingly delayed to September or October.
Ramaphosa has also emerged as a key focal point for Africa-wide responses. As current chair of the African Union (AU) he leads the continental engagement with the World Health Organization (WHO), and the various international finance institutions, while South African officials are working with the AU and the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) on a push for African debt restructuring.
He has also been active in trouble shooting to unlock external assistance to the continent, including from China and Russia. Appointing special envoys is typical of his boardroom-honed leadership style.
International and regional partnerships are vital for resilience and the arrival of 217 Cuban doctors to South Africa is strongly reminiscent of the liberationist solidarity of the Cold War era. And regional economies remain dependent on South Africa to protect their own vulnerable citizens. Following the 2008 financial crisis, it was South Africa’s regional trading relationships that remained robust, while trade with its main global partners in China and the US dropped.
Despite the plaudits, Ramaphosa remains vulnerable to challenge at home, notably around his failure to stimulate South Africa’s moribund economy. On the eve of lockdown, Moody’s joined its peers Standard and Poor’s and Fitch in giving South Africa a below investment grade credit rating. The move was a long time coming. Long mooted economic reforms were slow to materialise, and South Africa had fallen into recession.
Ramaphosa depends on a small core of close advisors and allies, initially united in apparent opposition to the kleptocratic rule of President Jacob Zuma and the deep patronage networks he created within both the party and the state. But this allegiance is being tested by economic reality. Support within the party was already drifting prior to the crisis.
Disagreements are not just technocratic – there are big ideological questions in play around the role of the state in the economy, the level of intervention, and its affordability, with key government figures sceptical of rapid market reforms. Energy minister and former union stalwart Gwede Mantashe is wary of job losses, and minister of public enterprises Pravin Gordhan protective of state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Before coronavirus hit, Ramaphosa seemed content to allow these policy disputes to play themselves out with little decisive intervention.
Slow progress on reform, against worsening economic performance, left Ramaphosa and his allies exposed. In January the president missed the UK’s African Investment Summit in order to assert control over a party meeting at which it was expected his detractors would seek to remove Gordhan.
As the independently assertive - and eminently quotable - pro-market reformist finance minister Tito Mboweni stated, ‘you can’t eat ideology’. Accelerated reform and restructuring is required if the government turns to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for assistance.
For the first time, Gordhan has been forced to deny a bailout to beleaguered state airline South African Airways (SAA), and the government’s lockdown bailout of R300 billion has been applauded by business. Much like the fiscal stimulus and recovery plan of 2018, it relies on smart spending, targeting sectors with high multiplier effects. It also includes significant reserve bank loans.
But it has been criticised for not doing enough to help the most vulnerable. There is considerable fear of what could happen when the virus takes hold in South Africa’s townships and informal settlements where social distancing is almost impossible, basic toilet facilities are shared, and HIV and TB rates high.
There are mounting concerns of the humanitarian cost of a prolonged lockdown, and the government has been faster than others in implementing a tiered lockdown system, trying to get people back to work and keep the economy afloat.
South Africa has been criticized by the UN for the use of lethal force by security forces in enforcing lockdown and, in a society plagued by corruption, there are fears legislation to stop the spread of false information could be used to restrict legitimate reporting on the virus response or other issues.
COVID-19 shines a spotlight on societies’ fault-lines worldwide. South Africa is often touted as having one of the highest levels of inequality in the world but, in a globalized economy, these divisions are international as much as they are local.
Resilience comes from within, but also depends on regional and global trading and financial systems. South Africans and international partners have long recognised Ramaphosa’s leadership qualities as an impressive voice for the global south.
But he must also be an advocate for South Africa’s poor. This crisis could accelerate implementation of his landmark pro-poor National Health Insurance and Universal Health Care programmes. Or the hit of COVID-19 on top of South Africa’s existing economic woes could see them derailed entirely. Ramaphosa must push through economic reforms at the same time as managing COVID-19 and rebuilding trust in his government.
Corporate Members Event Webinar Partners and Major Corporates
Online
Janet Napolitano, President, University of California; US Secretary of Homeland Security (2009-13)
Chair: Dr Robin Niblett, Director and Chief Executive, Chatham House
Across the globe, leaders on the local, national and international levels are grappling with the impacts of COVID-19 on their communities and the economy. But the coronavirus pandemic is just one of several existential crises the world is currently facing. Climate change, political instability and growing tensions with China and Russia, along with a lack of strong global leadership, has made it more difficult for individual nations to respond and coalesce in times of crisis.
This discussion will explore how leaders at all levels can best negotiate both the practical issues and the larger questions associated with these ‘grand challenges’. How is current US foreign policy affecting our collective ability to respond to issues such as pandemics or climate change? Has the COVID-19 crisis cemented the US retreat from global leadership and if so, who might step into the breach? How do we maintain momentum on other issues in the midst of a public health disaster of this magnitude? And what is the role of the business community, higher education institutions and other sectors in responding to these crises and shaping future public policy?
This event is only open to Major Corporate Member and Partner organizations and selected giving circles of Chatham House. If you'd like to attend, please RSVP to lbedford@chathamhouse.org.
7 May 2020 , Volume 96, Number 3
In the May 2020 issue of International Affairs, we explore the many uses of images in the conduct of global politics.
7 May 2020 , Volume 96, Number 3
7 May 2020 , Volume 96, Number 3
7 May 2020 , Volume 96, Number 3
7 May 2020 , Volume 96, Number 3
7 May 2020 , Volume 96, Number 3
7 May 2020 , Volume 96, Number 3
7 May 2020 , Volume 96, Number 3
Members Event Webinar
Emanuela-Chiara Gillard, Associate Fellow, International Law Programme, Chatham House
Chair: Chanu Peiris, Programme Manager, International Law Programme, Chatham House
Further speakers to be announced.
In April 2020, UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres called for a global ceasefire in order for communities and states to focus efforts on responding to the coronavirus outbreak. The consequences of armed conflict – including displacement, detention, lack of access to health services and disrupted social infrastructures – mean that those in conflict-ridden areas are amongst the most vulnerable to the virus. Observing international humanitarian law (IHL) could be one way of safeguarding against, at least, the provision of vital medical supplies and personnel for vulnerable groups. Against the backdrop of a growing health and economic emergency that is otherwise dominating government agendas, how do we emphasise the importance of humanitarian action and guarantee - or improve - compliance?
The panellists will discuss the remit and limitations of international humanitarian law and how the pandemic might complicate compliance. What is the framework for humanitarian action under international humanitarian law? What are the challenges to delivering relief? And how has COVID-19 impacted humanitarian action in conflict-ridden areas?
This event is for Chatham House members only. Not a member? Find out more.
7 May 2020 , Volume 96, Number 3
7 May 2020 , Volume 96, Number 3
7 May 2020 , Volume 96, Number 3
7 May 2020 , Volume 96, Number 3
7 May 2020 , Volume 96, Number 3
Invitation Only Research Event
6 May 2020
Coronavirus is a godsend for Algeria’s government to introduce restrictive measures beyond those needed to contain COVID-19. But its new leaders are missing a chance to gain legitimacy, which will offset the socio-economic fallout of the drop in oil prices.Although protests successfully ended Abdelaziz Bouteflika’s 20-year sultanistic rule a little over one year ago, demands have been continuing to dismantle the system, get rid of the old personnel, and institute democracy.
The controversial election in December of Abdelmadjid Tebboune — who has inherited a disastrous situation — has not tempered the determination of the Hirak protest movement. As a former minister and prime minister under Bouteflika, the new president has won little legitimacy, and protests have continued.
Now COVID-19 is worsening already dire economic conditions, such as a sharp drop in oil prices. By the beginning of May, statistics showed 10% of confirmed cases have ended in fatality, the highest percentage in the region.
Hirak had already called for the suspension of the marches — mobilising online instead — before the government’s measures, which include curfews and lockdowns, demonstrating a high sense of duty. But instead of appeasing Hirak’s demands, the government has maintained the authoritarian style of its predecessors.
Tebboune released more than 5,000 prisoners on March 31 but kept prisoners of conscience and leaders of the hirak imprisoned, then subsequently imprisoned journalists and activists. It even passed a controversial penal law, that also covers fake news, and may be used to justify actions against journalists.
The regime wishes to see an end to the Hirak, and rejects accusations of totalitarianism by insisting freedom and a democratic climate exist in Algeria.
Tebboune’s actions contradict his praise for the ‘blessed’ hirak and his promises of instituting the rule of law. In proclaiming the measures, the government has shown disappointing leadership, acting in an authoritarian fashion.
Tebboune also declared proudly that Algeria was fully prepared to fight the coronavirus epidemic, an optimistic claim given the country has only 400 intensive care unit (ICU) beds, or one per 100,000 people. Despite hundreds of billions of hydrocarbon dollars accumulating during the Bouteflika-era, Algeria’s health system ranks 173 out of 195 countries.
Algerians often refer to hospitals as ‘mouroirs’, meaning ‘places for the dying’. Not only has the state failed to build modern hospitals but basic hygienic conditions are lacking, and government officials prefer being treated overseas. A 2014 project to build five university hospitals was abandoned, leaving the health sector in deplorable shape.
Before Chinese assistance arrived, the glaring lack of equipment to protect caregivers and care for the sick was evident. Prime Minister Abdelaziz Djerad admitted the health system required a ‘total overhaul’. The president recently stated Algeria’s doctors are among the 'best in the world' but didn't address why almost 15,000 Algerian doctors practice in France.
Strict containment measures are in sync with most countries but implementation is challenging when most people live in overcrowded urban dwellings (the average household consists of 5.9 members).
Water shortages in many areas makes good hygiene and decontamination impossible, while schools and universities find online teaching difficult when many students do not possess laptops or internet connections. And only 20% of Algerians have debit cards in a cash-dominated economy because of low trust in the public-dominated banking sector, making online shopping capability low.
An already declining macroeconomic situation is worsening due to COVID-19. The IMF revised its 2020 estimates for Algeria, forecasting a catastrophic contraction of -5.2% in a country where hydrocarbons account for 93% of export revenues and 60% of its budget.
Foreign currency reserves are now an estimated $55 billion (expected to fall to $44billion by the end of 2020), down from $200 billion in 2014, and Algerian crude has recently traded close to production costs, with the fiscal breakeven oil price at $157.
In line with its historic aversion to external borrowing, Tebboune recently ruled out seeking financial support from the ‘IMF or other foreign banks’, as he argued such borrowing undermines sovereign foreign policy because - when indebted - ‘we cannot talk about either Palestine or Western Sahara’, two causes dear to Algeria. ‘Friendly countries’ - most likely a reference to China - are said to have offered to grant loans which have been declined for now.
The government is forecasted to face a 20% budget shortfall this year, but Algeria’s fiscal response to COVID-19 is actually the largest among the regional hydrocarbon exporters at an estimated 8% of GDP, compared to an average of 3.2%. However, the government revised downwards its 2020 public spending by 50% (a second cut in a month, from an initial 30% reduction), halting state projects and slashing its $41 billion import bill by 25% while expanding agricultural production. National oil company SONATRACH will also cut planned investment by half to $7 billion but plans have been revealed to develop other natural resources including gold, uranium and phosphates.
But recent growth rates are insufficient to create jobs for those entering the labour market. Despite government attempts to support a rather anaemic ‘formal’ private sector, estimates are 700,000 jobs could be lost due to potential bankruptcies from reduced activity and a loss of markets abroad.
Facing potential social unrest and the quasi-preservation of a tired social contract, the government has committed to upholding public sector wages - including for 50% of the civil servants told to stay home - protecting sacrosanct, unsustainable subsidies, and increasing health expenditure to strengthen the capacity to combat COVID-19.
A supplementary finance law will include various measures that support businesses and the economic fallout. However, while the government is to be commended for its efforts to aid businesses, supporting large swathes of the population is challenging as approximately 50% of the workforce operate in the informal economy.
Weak administrative capacity and insufficient data to implement cash transfers makes the planned ‘solidarity allowance’ of 10,000 dinars ($80) for Ramadan difficult to allocate to those who most need it (especially those in the informal sector). Families, communities, and religious organisations continue to be a social safety net.
So COVID-19 has not created new problems, it has merely magnified and exacerbated the numerous inequalities and failures of the Bouteflika regime to sufficiently invest in human security (economic, food, health environmental, personal, community, and political). Typically, whenever oil prices and related earnings dwindle, the political system promises to reform and diversify the economy. Tebboune is repeating this same old tune.
There are positive elements, such as the government’s realization it must initiate genuine reforms. And local enterprises have been successfully producing artificial respirators, surgical masks, and other materials. Algerians, including the Hirak, are showing great social solidarity.
But the government must capitalize on these positive actions by introducing real change. Because, if not, Hirak will certainly be back in force once the crisis is over, and operating in an environment of worsening socioeconomic problems. The medicine of the past will not work.